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Abstract
We examine deadlines-induced behavior using large-scale, high frequency data on about
5 million U.S. patents and published applications. We motivate the study with a model of
rational agents facing discontinuous incentives around deadline thresholds, without using time-
inconsistent preferences invoked in behavioral economics models of deadline-related behavior.
Consistent with our model predictions, we find notable clustering of more complex patent
applications around potential deadlines at month-, quarter- and year-ends, along with a small
to moderate decline in work quality around those periods.
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1 Introduction
Repeated routines are an integral part of how organizations execute tasks (Nelson and Winter
1982). Mandatory financial reporting routines for publicly listed firms are perhaps the most
visible example. Other examples include routines for internal management reporting, employee
performance evaluations, capital and operating budgeting, and payroll and supplier payments
processing. Closely related to these routines are ‘deadlines’, or specific end-dates to complete
certain tasks, with penalties for delaying work beyond the deadline.1
While routine-related deadlines are widespread, empirical studies of their effects in workplace
settings are relatively rare. Results from studies of responses to inter-temporal incentives (e.g.,
Asch 1990, Courty and Marschke 1997, Oyer 1998) suggest that work flows will be affected by
such deadlines. Surprisingly, there is little evidence on the effects beyond those on work flows.
In particular, two important and related questions have been under-investigated. The first, with
implications for models of underlying worker behavior, is how sorting of tasks is influenced by
deadlines. To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that examine this question. The
second, crucial for understanding consequences of deadlines for workplace productivity, is whether
any shifts in work flows are associated with changes in work quality. Other than the notable
exceptions of Cadena et al. (2011) and Carpenter et al. (2012), there are few studies on this topic.
In this study, we use large scale, high frequency data on patents and patent applications to shed
light on these questions.
We motivate our empirical investigations using a simple, but novel, model where agents
trade-off penalties for missing deadlines with the costs of additional errors should they choose
to accelerate task completion. The model predicts several deadline-related phenomena as results
of rational responses to discontinuous incentives around deadline thresholds. Though our model
is agnostic about why deadlines arise, in spirit, it departs from the broad motivation discussed
in the behavioral economics literature: dissuading procrastination induced by “irrational” time-
inconsistent preferences (Akerlof 1991, Clark 1994, O’Donaghue and Rabin 2001, Kaur, Kremer
and Mullainathan 2010).2 In so doing, we hope to offer an explanation of some deadline-related
empirical regularities without invoking time-inconsistent preferences.
Broadly, our model makes three predictions. First, it unambiguously predicts bunching of
1We use ‘routine’ in a narrower sense than Nelson and Winter (1982) who define it to include anything ‘regular
and predictable’...[such as]...routines for producing things, [and] procedures for hiring and firing (p.14).
2Another motivation, not based on time-inconsistent behavior, is that deadlines help with coordination and control
(Simon 1947, Nelson and Winter 1982, March and Olsen 1989, Knott and McKelvey 1999). Becker (2004) reviews the
literature on organizational routines. Besides coordination and control, other potential objectives of routines include
economizing on cognitive capacity (Simon 1947, Hayek 1952), reducing uncertainty (Becker 2004), helping improve
learning (Langlois 1992), and storing tacit knowledge (Nelson and Winter 1982).
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work close to deadlines; this arises from the discontinuity of incentives, which makes it worthwhile
for agents to accelerate some of the tasks to finish them before the deadline. Second, under
some conditions, the model predicts that more complex tasks are more likely to be accelerated for
completion. Finally, if more complex tasks are accelerated, and if the deadline penalties are low
enough, then tasks completed close to deadlines are on average more error prone.
Our empirical analysis uses large-scale data on granted patents (about 3 million) and
published applications (about 1.9 million) in the U.S, and consists of three parts. First, we examine
whether work flows, as measured by patterns in patent filings, are influenced by periodic deadlines.
We then analyze characteristics of patents and patent applications to investigate if relatively more
(or less) important tasks are completed near deadlines. Finally, we study whether there are any
associated changes in work quality, i.e., whether the quality of patent applications completed close
to deadlines are systematically different from those filed at other times.
Patent filings are a particularly interesting context because firms have strong incentives to
avoid delays while simultaneously maintaining accuracy of the application. The date of filing the
application is extremely critical in the patent application process; in most cases, this date becomes
the “priority date” – the date that determines legal priority over rival claims on the same idea.
Thus, in general, it is valuable to file earlier, as disputes related to delayed filing could be very
costly.3 However, submitting a premature, inaccurate or incomplete application to avoid delays
is not costless. Such applications are returned by the USPTO with an ‘Application Incomplete
Notice’, which adds to the review time and creates among others, a risk of loss of the priority date.
Thus, firms and their lawyers have to carefully balance these tradeoffs when evaluating the timing
of their filings.
If ideas arrive randomly (as assumed in most models of stochastic R&D) and are processed
without accelerations or delays, the distribution of patent filings will be uniform over time. However,
consistent with the presence of deadline penalties, we find strong clustering of patent filings in the
data, with significant month-end, quarter-end, and year-end spikes in filing dates (Figure 2). For
instance, the last 5 working days of a month account for 26.6% of all successful patent filings versus
about 22.4% for the first 5 working days. Additional clustering is also observed at typical financial
quarter-ends – March, June, September and December. These four months account for 36.3% of
3Under the laws in place during the period of our data, technically there were exceptions to the rule that the first
to file gets priority for the idea. In particular, our data are all from the “first-to-invent” regime; i.e., in a dispute over
priority, the inventor who can establish they were the first to invent (the invention specified under the patent) has
priority. However, in practice even under the first-to-invent regime, the filing date was viewed by firms and lawyers
as very important, as it had serious legal consequences for the inventors (Merrill, Levin and Myers 2004). We provide
more details in Section 4. On September 16, 2011, the “Leahy-Smith America Invents Act” was signed into law,
which made the filing date of paramount importance. This Act specifies a “first-to-file” system; i.e., in the event of
a dispute, the inventor who files first is entitled to the patent.
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all successful patent filings, compared to 33% in case of uniform filing. Similarly, firms file 12.9% of
their patents in the month that their fiscal year ends, almost 50% higher than the expected uniform
rate of 8.3% per month.
We then investigate reasons behind these work flow spikes. A number of different approaches
strongly suggest that these clustering patterns are driven by routine-generated deadlines at large
firms. First, corporate assignees exhibit these patterns but individual assignees, who are unlikely
to have patent filing routines, do not. Second, patent filings of higher patent-volume firms exhibit
significantly stronger clustering patterns. Third, changes in firms’ fiscal years are systematically
associated with changes in clustering patterns. Finally, detailed, semi-structured interviews with
patent attorneys working for top patenting firms reveal a strong role for deadlines related to annual
(and quarterly) corporate planning and reporting cycles and monthly billing cycles at law firms
in generating the clustering patterns. These results are consistent with our model as well as with
findings in the literature that document agents’ modification of work efforts in response to incentives
(e.g., Asch 1990, Courty and Marschke 1997, Oyer 1998).4
Turning to the analysis of task sorting, we examine three measures that are likely to be related
to the quality (or importance) of the underlying idea: the log number of claims in the application,
the log number of forward citations, and the probability of renewal of the patent. With all three
measures, we find robust evidence that month-end applications are of higher complexity/importance
(Figure 4). The economic magnitude is modest: for the last three working days, the number of
claims is higher by 0.95%, the log number of cites by 0.6%, and the probability of renewal by 0.2%.
These results are consistent with our model’s prediction that under some conditions, when faced
with discontinuous incentives around deadlines, agents sort tasks such that more complex work is
more prone to be accelerated and completed just before deadlines.
The final piece of our analysis focuses on work quality. We use three measures of work quality:
the probability of obtaining an ‘Application Incomplete’ notice from the USPTO, the probability of
final approval, and the duration of review for successful applications. The first of these metrics is a
shorter-term measure and a direct indicator of documentation quality. These notices are usually due
to a failure to complete administrative formalities (e.g., omitting some of the required documents)
and hence are a sign of deficiencies during the last stage of the patent filing process. Importantly,
such notices require rework and re-filing by the lawyers and thus impose sizeable short-term costs on
the filing firm. Consistent with our model prediction, we find that month-end applications are more
likely to receive an ‘Application Incomplete’ notice from the USPTO: a 3.6% higher probability for
4In an interesting study, Oyer (1998) exploits variations in fiscal year-ends to document that manufacturing firm
sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning, consistent with salespersons and executives
responding to convex incentives which induce them to cluster effort in the last quarter of the firm’s fiscal year.
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the last 3 working days, relative to an overall average of 29%, which translates to a 12.4% higher
incompletion rate.
Longer-term impacts on the ultimate fate of the application are more modest in terms
of economic significance: the predicted approval probability of an application filed in the last
three working days of a month is about 0.46% lower than that of applications filed by the same
firm on other days. This translates into a 2.4% increase in rejection probability, given that the
average approval rate is about 81% in our sample. Month-end applications also take slightly but
systematically longer: the review length is about 1.5% greater for applications filed in the last 3
working days of the month.5 The earlier findings on task sorting also rule out as an alternative
explanation for lower month-end work quality: that patent attorneys complete work on the “higher
value” ideas promptly, but postpone and then potentially rush work on lower value ideas close to
deadlines.
Our work contributes to related literatures in a number of ways. First, we present a simple
model of discontinuous incentives around deadlines that is able to explain key empirical regularities
without invoking time-inconsistent preferences of agents. Second, by providing systematic evidence
from an extremely time-sensitive setting, we add to the literature on the role of deadlines in altering
work flows (e.g. Oyer 1998). Third, we contribute to the very limited literature on the relationship
between deadline-driven behavior and output quality (Cadena et al. (2011), Carpenter et al.
(2012)). To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to use such large scale, high frequency
data on work flows encompassing many firms to examine the effect of work clustering on work
quality.
Fourth, while our study lacks advantages of randomized field and laboratory experiments
(such as in Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) and Cadena et al. (2011)), we contribute by looking
at a very similar work process at a daily level across thousands of firms over several decades.
Furthermore, the richness and scope of the data not only provide a very fine-grained look at an
important work process but also allow us to use firm, period and other fixed effects along with
other controls to condition for a variety of potential omitted variables, and rule out alternative
explanations. Fifth, ours is one of the first studies to analyze the relationship between task
characteristics and deadlines, and show that more complex tasks are more likely to be completed
close to deadlines. This is particularly relevant for building a model of underlying worker behavior
because models of procrastinating behavior such as O’Donaghue and Rabin (2001) have implications
5The weaker effects on the longer-term measures are not surprising. The quality or novelty of the underlying
idea, which is set well in advance of the filing date, strongly affects the longer-term outcomes. Hence, they are likely
to be noisier indicators of application draft quality, compared to the shorter-run ‘Application Incomplete’ measure
which better captures effects of drafting errors or oversights. Therefore, while work completion close to deadlines
is accompanied by significantly more errors, these are not so severe that it significantly delays or very substantially
impacts the ultimate success of the application.
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about which types of tasks may be more prone to procrastination. Finally, by studying the
relatively under-examined process aspects of patenting, our paper also incidentally contributes
to the literature on patents spawned by the seminal work of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a model that generates predictions
about the impact of deadlines on work flows, task sorting and work quality. Section 3 describes
various data sources, while Section 4 provides a brief description of the patent application rules and
processes. Section 5 analyzes deadline-driven behavior in the flow of patent applications. Section 6
examines task sorting around the month-end deadlines. In Section 7, we present evidence on work
quality around deadlines along with robustness checks relating to lower work quality at close to
month-ends. Section 8 briefly discusses a simulation that links our model to the empirical findings.
Finally, Section 9 discusses and concludes.
2 A Model of Deadlines
In this section, we present a model of deadline-driven behavior that motivates our empirical
examination and offers a potential explanation for our findings. In the model, agents complete
independent tasks, possibly of varying complexities, that arrive randomly over time. The optimal
time taken to complete a given task depends on the costs and benefits to the agent from completing
that task. We model deadlines as periodically occuring ‘checkpoints’, when a monitor imposes a
cost on the agent for having incomplete tasks. To keep the scope manageable, we do not model
the monitor’s decisions, and treat deadlines as exogenous to the agents.6 Note that we are agnostic
about the need for deadlines. The model does not endogenize the provision of the deadline penalty;
thus deadlines may be related to coordination motives (Nelson and Winter, 1982) or designed to
solve self-control problems (O’Donaghue and Rabin, 2001).
2.1 Tasks and Task Arrival Process
Tasks vary in complexity, defined by a continuous scalar, x ∈ [1, X], with a CDF that has
strictly positive support over the entire domain. The benefits, net of all costs other than errors
(described below), to completing a task are assumed to be given by a(x)t , with a(x) positive, bounded
and continuous, and a′(x) > 0. Thus, more complex tasks are more valuable, and the benefits of
completing a task are inversely proportional to the time taken to complete the task. Task execution
involves errors, which are costly. We assume that agents exercise the same level of diligence on all
tasks and at all times so that, conditional on time spent, the error rate depends only on complexity.
6For instance, this is likely to be the case if these tasks are one of many processes in a firm, which then imposes
monthly, quarterly and annual deadlines for co-ordination across these processes.
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where x is complexity of the task, t is the duration and b(x) is a positive, bounded and continuous
function. Thus, speeding up execution increases error rate and associated costs quadratically. Since
errors are more likely on complex tasks, we assume b′(x) > 0. Tasks arrive at every instant, t, with
the number of arrivals per instant distributed identically, independently and uniformly over the set
{0,1,2,...,M}. The complexity distribution is uncorrelated with the time of arrival, so that both
number and complexity of applications are i.i.d over time.
2.2 Optimal Task Duration and Work Flow without Deadlines

















We assume that a(x) and b(x) are such that b(x)a(x) and
a(x)2
b(x) are strictly increasing in x, and
b(1)
a(1) > 1.
Together, these assumptions imply that the optimal task duration is higher for more complex tasks,
that the maximized net benefits are higher for more complex tasks, and that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between x and t∗.
Definition 1. Define τ(t∗) as the PDF of the distribution of optimal task durations, corresponding
to the complexity distribution over the set [1,X]. Let τ be the mean optimal task duration and T
and T be the minimum and maximum durations, i.e., t∗(1) = T ; t∗(X) = T . It can be verified that
τ(.) is continuous and has positive support over [T , T ].
Given our assumptions, the completion of tasks is uniform. In particular, the expected mass
of tasks completed every instant is identical, and equal to M2
∫ T
T τ(t
∗)dt∗=M2 . The mean complexity
of tasks, as measured by the optimal task duration, is τ .
2.3 Deadlines
Deadlines occur once for every length of time D > 0, defined as one period. At this point, the
monitor imposes as an extra penalty (cost) on agents for having incomplete tasks at the deadline.
In particular, we assume that this cost is γc(x) , where γ > 0 and c(x) (> 0) is bounded, continuous,
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and non-decreasing in complexity (i.e., the deadline cost is same or higher for more complex tasks).7
For tasks that span multiple deadlines, we assume that the cost is imposed only on the last deadline.
We assume that a task of duration t∗ arriving at instant d is completed at instant d + t∗. Let
z be the time between the planned end time and the closest prior period-end deadline. Then
z = Mod(t∗+d,D), if t∗ > (D−d) where d is the instant that the task arrives. Since the arrival of
tasks is uniform, for any given t∗, z will be distributed uniformly over the set [0, t∗] if t∗ ≤ D, and
over the set [0, D] if t∗ > D. Note that tasks with t∗ > D span across more than one period, and
hence, the penalty is relevant only at the last deadline. Therefore, the acceleration of such tasks is
limited to a maximum of D.
Assuming agents are forward-looking and have rational expectations, they choose whether or not to
accelerate a task when it arrives. In particular, a task of complexity x is rescheduled to be finished






















where f(t∗) = b(x)c(x) . Let F and F be the lower and upper bounds of f(t
∗) respectively.
2.4 Work Flows
Lemma 1. For any given t∗ and γ, we can find a z close enough to zero that inequality (5) holds.
This follows from the fact that the numerator z2 can be made arbitrarily close to zero while keeping
the denominator bounded below at a positive value.
Lemma 2. For any given t∗ and γ, there is an upper bound, z∗(t∗, γ) above which it is not optimal
to accelerate so as to finish the task by the deadline. The upper bound has the following properties:









∗ is increasing in γ for any given t∗ (iii) z
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t∗ is increasing































for high enough γ
An upper bound exists because the left hand side of inequality (5) is increasing in z for any given
7For instance, this may be appropriate if a firm bills its clients monthly, and bills them more for more complex
tasks. So, missing the month-end billing deadline would mean waiting for another month to receive payments.
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t∗ and γ. The upper bound is obtained by setting the left hand side to γ and solving for z∗. See
appendix for proof of the other properties.
Proposition 1. In a regime with a deadline penalty, there is clustering of task completions at
the period-end. Tasks of all complexities get accelerated, though not all to the same extent. The















The proof directly follows from the lemmas, and z being distributed uniformly for any given t∗.
Corollary 1. The clustering of task completions is increasing in γ.
2.5 Task Sorting
Unlike in the above analyses of work flows, whether more complex or less complex tasks get
accelerated to meet deadlines depends on f(t∗). In particular, the slope of f(t∗) determines if the
fraction of tasks to be accelerated (as determined by z
∗
t∗ for tasks with t
∗ ≤ D, and z∗D for tasks
with t∗ > D) is increasing or decreasing in complexity.
Proposition 2. In a regime with a deadline penalty, the relation between clustering and task
complexity is as follows. If f ′(t∗) < 2f(t
∗)
t∗ for all t
∗, there is greater clustering of higher complexity







2γF for all t∗, tasks at the ends of the




2γF̄ for all t∗,
there is greater acceleration among tasks of lower complexity.
Corollary 2. If f(t∗) is decreasing, then more complex tasks will be accelerated more than less
complex tasks.
See proof in the appendix. Broadly speaking, under the first condition, z∗(t∗, γ) and z
∗
t∗ are
increasing in t∗. Therefore, the fraction of tasks accelerated to be completed at the deadline
( z
∗
t∗ for tasks with t
∗ ≤ D, and z∗D for tasks with t
∗ > D) is increasing in t∗. This, in turn, implies
greater clustering of more complex tasks. Under the second condition, z∗ is increasing in t∗ but z
∗
t∗
is decreasing. Therefore, tasks at both ends of the complexity distribution are accelerated more.
Now we consider what happens to average task complexity of accelerated tasks as γ increases.
Proposition 3. Consider a deadline-penalty regime where the penalties are s.t. higher (lower)
complexity tasks are accelerated. In such a regime, as γ increases, initially at low values of γ, the
average complexity of accelerated tasks increases (decreases). Eventually, beyond sufficiently high
values of γ, the average complexity of accelerated tasks tends to τ .
The first part follows from Lemma 2(iv). For tasks with t∗ ≤ D, the second part follows from the
latter part of the same lemma. For tasks with greater complexity, suppose z∗ is increasing in t∗.
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Then, as γ increases, z∗ = D for tasks of sufficiently high complexity. This implies that all tasks
of those complexities, irrespective of the instant of arrival, are accelerated. As γ increases further,
the same condition is achieved for tasks of lower complexity, and eventually at a high enough γ, all
tasks with t∗ > D are accelerated, irrespective of the instant of duration. Thus, beyond this γ, the
mean complexity of tasks with t∗ > D stays constant. However, at this γ and beyond, not all tasks
with t∗ ≤ D are accelerated, and their mean continues to tend to τ . A similar argument holds if
z∗ is decreasing in t∗.
2.6 Work Quality
Proposition 4. In a regime with a deadline penalty, conditional on complexity, there is a higher
expected error rate for tasks completed at the deadline. As γ increases, for tasks with t∗ ≤ D, the
error rate increases without bound. For other tasks, the error rate increases but is bounded.





greater than 0. Thus, conditional on complexity, the error rates are higher as long as γ > 0. Since
z∗ is increasing in γ, the error rate is increasing in γ. The boundedness of error on complex tasks
follows from the fact that the maximum acceleration for tasks with t∗ > D is D.
Proposition 5. In a deadline-penalty regime with a low enough γ s.t. for any given complexity,
there is some fraction of tasks that are unaccelerated, and if f ′(t∗) < 2f(t
∗)
t∗ , unconditional on
complexity, there is a higher expected error rate for tasks completed at the deadline.





. This, by assumption,
is increasing in complexity x, which implies that error rate of unaccelerated tasks is increasing in
complexity. In the presence of deadlines, and with these assumptions, a greater fraction of complex
tasks are accelerated to be completed at the period-end deadlines. Since these accelerated tasks
have a higher error rate, the average error rate for tasks completed at the period-end is higher than
the mean baseline error rate.
Given the scope of this paper, we do not analyze the optimality of penalty structures and
deadline frequencies. A brief analysis of the impact of decreasing D is presented in the appendix.
We now turn to the data.
3 Data
We draw from a number of data sources and methods. The primary source of our patent data
is the USPTO. We purchased from the USPTO a DVD that contains data on all utility patents
granted between January 1976 and August 2009 (a total of 3,209,376 patents). From this DVD,
we obtained the patent number, U.S. classes and subclasses, the number of claims and application
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year of each patent. Further, these data were used to compute the number of citations to a patent.
For most of our analysis, we use only data on patents assigned to “organizations,” identified by
assignee codes ‘2’ and ‘3’. Further, within these, we excluded patents assigned to universities and
multiple assignees. Finally, we eliminated patents that were not applied on a USPTO working day
(0.6% of patents).
We supplemented the USPTO patent data with the NBER Patent Data (2009), which is an
updated version of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001). This dataset provides a dynamic matching
between the firm name in Compustat and the assignee name in the USPTO patent data.8 This
dataset contains comprehensive information on the U.S. utility patents granted between 1976 and
2006. In order to assign ownership after 2006, we used the assignee names and identifiers from the
USPTO data, and assumed that ownership of assignees did not change after 2006. In case a new
assignee was observed in the USPTO data after 2006, it was treated as a new firm.
To examine the potential role of patent attorneys, we obtained data on patent attorneys
associated with each patent from the Patent Network Dataverse (Lai, D’Amour and Fleming,
2009). These data are relatively complete only after 1995. In the data, Lai et al. also disambiguate
the name of inventors and assign unique identifiers to each inventor that appear in patents granted
between 1975 and 2008. In a robustness check, we use this information to control for inventor-level
heterogeneity by exploiting inventor mobility between firms.
We also used application data that include both successful patent applications and those that
were finally rejected. To analyze the probability of approval of applications, we purchased detailed
data on patent applications from Fairview Research LLC. The data include information on all U.S.
Pre-Grant Applications published by the USPTO between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2010.
In addition to the application filing date and application number, the database includes application
type (utility or design), number of claims, publication type, and importantly (to control for firm
fixed effects), standardized assignee names.9 To merge the application data with other patent
databases, we did some further standardization of the assignee names.10
To examine potential differences in the complexity of examination process across patents, we
collected from Google Patents the transaction history of patent applications.11 The USPTO records
8Firms often file patents under different names (“assignees”). Further, firm ownership may change over time due to
mergers and acquisitions, whereas the USPTO assignee name is frozen at the time of patent grant. The NBER Patent
Data enables us to reflect the ownership changes and thereby minimize measurement errors due to misidentification.
9Assignee names are often not available in USPTO data because they are not tracked closely by the USPTO;
assignment is made in many cases some time after the application is initially filed, and while this information is made
public, the published application on the USPTO site often does not report the assignee. Fairview Research tracks
the assignee information available in other USPTO documents and attributes it to the patent application.
10All code used for data cleaning and analysis are available on request from the authors.
11The site’s URL is http://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-pair.html. Google, under the agreement
with the USPTO, has made bulk downloads of these ‘PAIR’ data publicly available. As of August 2012, the Google
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every administrative action associated with each patent application starting with the initial exam
team assignment to the final grant or abandonment. This enables a tracing of the entire review
process for each application up to the most current transaction. To allow for a sufficient time
between filing and the final decision, we limited to the applications filed by U.S. firms during the
period of 2001-04. As of January 2012, which was the time of our data collection, about 52%
of the applications were available for downloads. Even with this subset, downloading the entire
documents posed technical challenges as many of the files were very large in size (some over 8 GB
in zipped format). Trading off these challenges against diminishing benefits of increasing sample
size, we downloaded a 25% random sample of the available applications, stratified by file size.
We supplemented the above data with information from a series of interviews with
practitioners (inventors and attorneys) who all have had extensive first-hand experience in filing
patent applications. The purpose of these interviews, conducted between December 2010 and March
2011, was to obtain detailed information on the patenting process inside firms, as well as to gain
insights on the clustering of patent applications (documented in Section 5.1 below). The list of
interviewees included: (a) legal staff (mostly Intellectual Property (IP) attorneys) at seven large
patent-intensive firms; (b) legal staff from six independent IP law firms; and (c) four inventors each
of whom had multiple inventions patented at different global electronics and semiconductor firms.
The interviews, conducted either via phone or in-person, lasted from a minimum of 20 minutes to a
maximum of two hours. All of these interviews were semi-structured; we first asked the interviewee
several standardized questions based on our observations and then opened it up to unstructured
responses. The information collected through these interviews formed the basis of our discussion on
the process of patent application in Section 4.2. The responses of the interviewees about observed
patent flows are discussed in Section 5.5. Because we promised respondents confidentiality, names
of respondents and individual firms are kept anonymous.
4 Patent Application Rules and Processes
Before proceeding to the empirics, we provide a brief institutional background by describing
the general process of patent application and discussing the importance of filing on time. We
particularly focus on the factors that affect the timing of patent application and discuss how routines
and deadlines, both internal and external, may play a role in this process. We first discuss various
rules that regulate the timing of patent application.12 Based on our interviews with practitioners,
we then provide detailed steps of a typical patenting process from the inception of ideas to patent
filing.
PAIR bulk download project is still in progress.
12The specifics of the patenting procedure vary across jurisdictions; except wherein applicable, we limit our
discussion to the case of the U.S., as this is the context of our empirical analysis.
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4.1 Rules Affecting the Date of Patent Application
A patent is essentially a government-granted monopoly right to an invention. For a complete
application, the filing date of a non-provisional patent application is the date on which the
application is submitted for examination. Completeness is determined by the USPTO. Specifically,
there are three main elements that must be present in an application to be complete: the
specification, at least one claim, and the drawing. In addition, the application must also contain
the inventor oath or declaration and the appropriate filing fees (McWha and Ryan, 2008).13 For
mailed filings, the postmarked date is the date of application. For electronic filings (which is the
dominant form of filing today), it is the date of electronic submission. In principle, the filing
of a patent application establishes the right of priority and the filing date of the first patent
application becomes the priority date of the invention.14 Based on this priority, the claimant can
file a subsequent application in another jurisdiction for the same invention.
The filing date is also crucial in the event of a dispute over who was the first to invent. If two
inventors generated the same invention independently, (at the time of our study) the U.S. applied
a first-to-invent (FTI) rule to determine who is granted the patent.15 Even under this system,
however, the first person to file an application retained the prima facie right to the grant of a
patent. If a subsequent applicant wanted to claim priority for the same invention, they had to
institute interference proceedings to determine who the first inventor was. However, this procedure
was “costly and often very protracted; frequently it moves from a USPTO administrative proceeding
to full court litigation” (Merrill et al. 2004, pp. 124-125). Also, in practice, FTF has been the
basis for an overwhelming majority of applications in the U.S., with less than 0.1 percent of the
cases ending up in interference proceedings (Merrill et al. 2004). Hence, in general, the inventor
had strong incentives to file an application as soon as possible to establish effective priority.16
4.2 Patent Application Processes
A patent can be legally assigned to an organization (typically the inventor’s firm), or retained
by the individual inventor(s). In the former case, it is the organization who owns the claims, while
13The Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP), 1.53b reads “...the filing date of an application for patent
filed under this section...is the date on which a specification as prescribed by 35 U.S.C.112 containing a description
pursuant to 1.71 and at least one claim pursuant to 1.75, and any drawing required by 1.81(a) are filed in the Patent
and Trademark Office. No new matter may be introduced into an application after its filing date” (emphasis added).
14Under some conditions, the priority date is not the date of filing. Some rules allow for non-standard applications
such as provisional applications, continuations and divisions to claim a priority date different from the actual filing
date. While it is hard to identify such non-standard applications (because of limited information in the applications
data), we checked and found key results robust to excluding such non-standard approved patents from our analysis.
15As of October 2011, all countries but the U.S. adopt the first-to-file (FTF) system that assigns the right to
whoever first applies for a protection of the given invention by filing a patent application.
16Specifics of how a filer can establish an earlier priority date are set out in USPTO MPEP, 715.07(a). The U.S.
switched to a FTF system on March 6, 2013, when the America Invents Act came into effect.
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in the latter it is the inventor who owns all claims to the invention.17 Hence, depending on the
inventor’s affiliation, the application process can be quite different.
For individual assignees, there is no typical application process; the inventor decides whether
and when to apply for the protection of an invention.18 Also, the inventor faces few organizational
constraints in filing an application. The inventor may work with a patent lawyer for the actual
filing but key decisions lie with the inventor.
In contrast, the patent application process for R&D personnel at corporate firms is more
complex. The process typically begins with the inventor’s disclosure of an invention to an internal
review committee, and ends with either the abandonment of the idea or the filing of a patent
application. Figure 1 illustrates the process flow for a typical firm that has established procedures
for patent prosecution.19 This “disclosure” document is not yet a full description of the idea;
it could a be one-page memo or a short technical note that outlines the subject matter of the
invention. The review committee typically comprises senior managers in the R&D department
and the legal team that is responsible for patent prosecutions. The committee regularly meets
to discuss and determine if ideas submitted from various research teams are worth pursuing for a
patent.20 If an idea is approved by the committee, it is then drafted into a formal patent application
document. The inventor may write the first draft and pass it on to the legal staff, or the legal staff
may write up the draft based on the information the inventor provides. In either case, typically
multiple rounds of meetings take place between the inventor and the lawyer before the application
document is finalized. Many firms entirely outsource this portion of the patent prosecution to
external law firms, while some use a mix of internal and external lawyers.21 Once the patent
application is finalized, the lawyer (either internal or external) files it with the patent office in
the corresponding jurisdiction (e.g., USPTO, EPO), which then gives a unique identifier to each
application and assigns it to a patent examiner for a review.22 During the examination process,
the patent examiner may issue office actions that demand follow-up actions from the applicant
17We focus on firms here. For ease of exposition, we refer to inventors for whom there is no assignee in the USPTO
data (i.e. with assignee code = 1) as “individual assignees” or “inventor-owners,” and inventors whose patent is
assigned to an organization on the patent document as “R&D personnel.”
18About 14% of patents granted during 1976-2009 were unassigned, i.e., the ownership was retained by the inventors.
19Note that this flow is only broadly representative of the process followed by the firms we spoke with; specific
practices may vary across firms.
20This step of assessment often involves more than a simple selection or rejection. For those ideas that are selected
for the next step, the committee could further sort them into several “grade” levels depending on the expected value
of the idea. Lower-graded ideas may be pursued for patenting in a limited number of jurisdictions.
21Our interviews suggest that most firms have accelerated outsourcing of the application work. We discuss more
details on billing arrangements for external lawyers in Section 5.5. Based on data by Lai et al. (2009), and assuming
that applications with both the name of a law firm and names of lawyers on their front page were filed by external
lawyers, approximately 78% of patents filed after 1995 were by external lawyers.
22Since we are primarily interested in the timing of application, we do not discuss the internal processes in the
patent office.
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such as clarification on the invention’s specifications. These requests are mostly handled by the
lawyers who drafted the application. For many firms, external lawyers are also responsible for the
maintenance of granted patents such as alerting the client to renewal notices and, upon the client’s
renewal decision, paying renewal fees on behalf of the client.
5 Deadlines and Work Flow Clustering
We now turn to the empirical tests. In this section, we first document distinct clustering
patterns in patent filings at close to quarter- and month-ends over the calendar year. We then
provide robust evidence that these spikes in work flows are systematically driven by routine-
generated deadlines, especially at large corporate firms.
5.1 Work Flow Patterns over the Calendar Year
As discussed above, innovating firms face a strong incentive to file a complete patent
application at the earliest possible date. Then, if ideas arrive randomly over time, we should expect
to see the distribution of patent applications to be uniform over the calendar year. Contrary to
this expectation, however, we find significant deviations from a uniform filing pattern.
In Figure 2, we plot each calendar day’s average share of published applications filed between
2001 and 2009. Also plotted is the corresponding average share of granted patents (based on filing
date) for the same period. The vertical lines denote month-ends. The figure shows a substantial
upward spike in filings at the end of every month. September and June show the highest month-end
spikes, while the spiking pattern is somewhat muted for May, November and December.23 From
this figure it is clear that, on the aggregate, the filing of patent applications significantly deviates
from a uniform distribution and has periodic clusters at month-ends.
While consistent with our model prediction in the presence of deadline penalties, the
clustering patterns do not necessarily imply that they are driven by routine-generated deadlines or
deadline-related penalties. In the following sections, we provide a number of tests that help establish
a strong association between clustering patterns and routines-related deadlines. First, we examine
differences between patterns for individual assignees and corporate firms; we expect significantly
stronger clustering patterns for corporates since the latter are likely to have established routines
for dealing with patenting. Next, we look at the effect of firm patent volumes; because routines
and related deadlines are likely to be more established in firms with greater patent volumes, we
23All three months without a substantial spike have U.S. holidays at the end of the month - Memorial day in May,
Thanksgiving Day in November and Christmas in December. In May, even though there is no sharp month-end spike,
we notice a gradual increase in the share from the beginning of the month to the end of the month. In December, the
month-end spike is shifted to the days before December 25, suggesting that individuals try to complete their work
before Christmas. The four downward spikes correspond to January 1, July 4 (U.S. Independence Day), November
11 (Veterans Day in the U.S.) and December 25.
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expect the clustering effect to be positively correlated with firm size, as measured by annual patent
volumes. Third, we examine the effect of fiscal year ends; we expect firms with different fiscal year
ends to have different patterns of clustering, and we expect changes in clustering patterns for firms
that change fiscal year-ends. Finally, we present a synopsis of responses from patent practitioners,
which support a key role for deadlines at large firms and work arrangements between large firms
and external attorneys for the observed clustering of patent filing. We also examine robustness of
key empirical results to a range of additional tests.
5.2 Comparison between Individual Inventors and Corporate Firms
To compare filing patterns between firms and individual inventors, we first compute the daily
average share of granted patents separately for corporates and individual assignees. Figure 3 plots
the difference between the daily shares for these two categories of assignees. Every month-end shows
an upward spike indicating that the patent filing rate for corporates (relative to individual assignees)
increases sharply towards the end of the month.24 These spikes are particularly noteworthy at the
end of each quarter. Equally noteworthy is the significant difference between individual assignees
and corporates in December, which is the end of the fiscal year for most firms. Hence, Figure 3
strongly suggests that the patent filing work flows for corporates are significantly different from
those of individual assignees, and that the clustering patterns observed in Section 5.1 are driven
by corporate assignees.
We test the differences formally using the following OLS specification:
δd = β1D1−7 + β2D8−15 + β3D16−23 + β4D24+ + εd (6)
where Dm−n is a dummy variable that is 1 for days m to n of the month, and 0 otherwise;
δd = s
F
d − sId where sId is the average daily share of annual patents (or applications) for







where nIdt is the number of successful patents (or published
applications) applied by individuals in day d of year t and nIt is the number of successful patents
(or published applications) applied by individuals in year t.25 sFd is defined similarly for corporates.
Table 1 presents the results. In column 1, the coefficients on Days 1-7 and Days 8-15 are
strongly negative while the coefficient on Days 24+ is strongly positive. This indicates that large
firms tend to patent at a significantly higher rate than individual inventors during the last 6-7 days
of the month. In columns 2 and 3, we replace the dummy for Days 24+ with a dummy for the last
24A separate plot of the daily share for individual assignees (Appendix Figure A.1) shows almost no month-end
clustering, except at the end of September, which appears to be in response to potential fee hikes at the USPTO,





sId = 1 where the sum is taken over all days of the year.
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day of the month and a dummy for the last 3 days of the month, respectively. The coefficients on
these dummies are also strongly positive and higher in magnitude than the coefficient on Days 24+
in column 1. If patent filing patterns were uniform throughout the year and identical across firms,
we would expect 0.27% of annual patents in a single day for both individual inventors and firms.
However, based on column 2, firms file about 0.54% (computed as the sum of the coefficient on
the last-day dummy and the constant term) of annual patents on the last day of a month, which is
twice the expected daily rate.26 Column 3 yields similar results when we use a dummy for the last
3 days of the month.
5.3 Impact of Firm Size
Next, we examine the end-of-month behavior of large firms using patent-level regressions of
the following form:
Dnpjtm = α.yjt + τt + νm + εpjtm (7)
where Dnpjtm is a dummy variable that is 1 if patent (or application) p belonging to firm j was
applied in the last n working days of the month m in year t, y is a measure of firm size defined as
the number of patents (or applications) belonging to firm j that were applied in year t and τt and
νm are year and month fixed effects, respectively.
Table 2 presents results for three different end-of-month periods (1-working day, 3-working
days and 5-working days). The coefficient on firm size is consistently positive and significant at
the 1% level. The magnitude of the coefficients increases as the length of the end-of-month period
increases. Based on column 1, a 10% increase in firm-size is associated with an increase in the
probability of its patents being applied on the last day of the month by 2.842 X 10-4. This amounts
to a 7.1% increase in the probability of filing on the last day of the month.27. Similarly, based on
columns 2 and 3, a 10% increase in firm-size is associated with an increase in the probability of
patent applications in the last 3 working days by 4.6% and the probability of patent applications
in the last 5 working days by 3.3%. The results on published applications show comparable effects
(columns 4 through 6). Hence, end-of-month clustering is stronger for larger firms, consistent with
the expectation that deadlines related to large firm routines are driving work flow patterns.
26Since the dependent variable is a difference, it is possible that the coefficients reflect a lower than expected rate of
filing by individual assignees at month-ends. We ruled this out by running a separate regression similar to Equation
6 with the daily share for individual assignees as the dependent variable. The magnitude of the coefficient on Days
24+ was slightly higher (significant at the 10% level) than the coefficient on Days 1-7. Thus, individual assignees
do not appear to patent less towards the end of the month. This is also confirmed by Appendix Figure A.1. We
also checked the robustness of the OLS regression results in Table 1 to using multinomial logit regressions, where we
simultaneously examine the probability of a patent being applied in the first 3 working days and that of a patent
being applied in the last 3 working days of a month, relative to that of a patent being applied in the other working
days of the month. These results are available on request.
27Assuming that a year has 250 working-days and that applications occur uniformly over time and across firms,
the expected probability of a patent being applied on the last working day of the month is 4 X 10-3
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As a robustness check, we undertook an analysis similar to that in Table 1, except comparing
‘large’ corporates to ‘small’ corporates, with ‘large’ defined as assignees with more than 100 patents
filed over our data period, and ‘small’ defined as those with only one patent over the period. Results
(presented in Appendix Table A.1) confirm that the month-end clustering patterns are more striking
for large corporates.
5.4 Impact of Fiscal Year Differences
Public firms are required to report their financial accounts once every year. The need for such
periodic reporting usually creates deadlines internal to the firm and imposes them on some of the
firm’s external suppliers. For instance, firms may align their internal management reporting cycles
and performance targets with the fiscal year (Oyer, 1998) or insist that their suppliers submit their
payment requests by a certain date for it to be recognized as payable for that year. Firms are free
to choose their own year-long period as the fiscal year. Though a majority of U.S. firms choose the
calendar year (January 1 to December 31) as their fiscal year, some do not. Because the choice
of the fiscal year is unlikely to be influenced by patent filing patterns, cross-sectional differences
in fiscal year-ends across firms provides potentially exogenous variation to test for the presence of
clustering patterns related to financial reporting deadlines. We find that, across firms, clustering
is indeed correlated with fiscal year-ends. Specifically, Table 3 presents the monthly volumes of
patent filings for each month by the fiscal year-end. The data show that, within a fiscal year,
the share of filings that occur in the last month of the fiscal year is significantly larger than that
for any other month. For example, January accounts for 16.2% of all patents filed by firms with a
January-ending fiscal year; the corresponding figure for February is 22.1%. In every case, this share
is significantly higher than the share that would be expected were patenting uniform throughout
the year (8.3%).
For a variety of reasons unrelated to patenting, firms occasionally shift their fiscal years.
Following Oyer (1998), we exploit changes in fiscal year-ends to see if clustering patterns within
firms shift in the expected direction. This addresses the potential concern that omitted firm-
specific factors may be driving clustering patterns in the cross-sectional regressions. Specifically,
we examine regressions of the following form:
Dopjtm = γ.Dor + [α.yjt] + τt + νm + ηj + εpjtm (8)
Dnpjtm = γ̀.Dor + [α.yjt] + τt + νm + ηj + εpjtm (9)
Dnpjtm −Dopjtm = γ̄.Dor + [α.yjt] + τt + νm + ηj + εpjtm (10)
where Dopjtm is a dummy variable that is 1 if the patent was applied in the month in which the
old fiscal year ended, Dnpjtm is a dummy variable that is 1 if the patent was applied in the month
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in which the new fiscal year ended, and Dor is an “old regime” dummy variable equal to 1 for the
time period prior to the fiscal year switch. As before, yjt is log firm size measured in annual patent
volume, and τt, νm and ηj are year, month and firm fixed effects, respectively.
We estimate the above equations for a sample of “switchers,” i.e., firms that switch fiscal
years. In column 1 (specification 8) of Table 4, the coefficient on the old fiscal-year dummy is
strongly positive, implying that the propensity to file at the old fiscal year-end diminishes after
the switch. The magnitude indicates that, after the switch, the propensity to file a patent at the
old fiscal year-end decreases by 3.6%. This is very substantial when compared to the expected
uniform rate of filing (8.3%) in a month. In column 2 (specification 9), the coefficient on the old
fiscal-year dummy indicates that, after the switch, the propensity to file a patent at the new fiscal
year-end increases by 1.97%. Again, this is substantial relative to the expected uniform rate of
filing. Column 3 (specification 10 without the firm size control) confirms the net change (5.6%).
Adding the firm size control (column 4) yields very similar results. The results using published
applications (columns 5-8) also suggest a clear shift in the clustering patterns around fiscal year
changes. Together, these regressions provide robust evidence that fiscal year-end routines of firms
drive clustering patterns in patent filings.
5.5 Evidence from Interviews with Practitioners
Our interviews with practitioners also suggest a causal association between routine-driven
deadlines and work flow patterns in patent filing. In these interviews, we presented the findings on
the basic clustering patterns (Figure 2) to a number of corporate and external patent attorneys.
The respondents pointed to two types of routines for the observed patterns of clustering.
First, almost all the internal and external legal staff immediately pointed to planning and
reporting routines within firms as the likely driver of the quarterly and year-end clustering pattern.
Interviewees explained that patent-intensive firms often set annual targets for patent volumes, which
were then broken down into quarterly targets. A particular reason for breaking annual targets into
quarterly goals was for financial planning, as expenses incurred in applications had to be reflected on
quarterly accounting statements for listed firms.28 These targets and time-lines then impact both
arrangements and incentives for lawyers as well as R&D personnel. The respondents also mentioned
that most large firms entered into long-term contractual arrangements with external lawyers, with
specific targets for quarterly and annual patent filings. Failure to achieve these targets within the
indicated time period was typically viewed poorly, and could potentially lead to loss of business for
the law firm.29
28Our interviewees suggest that the costs including legal fees for each application typically ranged from US$8,000 to
US$12,000, so that these fees for patent-intensive firms could run to several hundred thousand dollars every quarter.
29Almost all the firms we spoke to also provide specific incentives to the R&D personnel to encourage patent
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Second, many of the lawyers suggested that billing routines coupled with contractual
arrangements between law firms and large corporate clients were the likely driver of the month-end
clustering patterns. Large firms typically enter into annual or quarterly contracts with external
lawyers, often for prosecuting a targeted volume of patents, and the term of the contracts usually
coincide with the annual or quarterly reporting cycles for the firms. In contrast, firms with
smaller volumes hire external lawyers on a case-by-case basis and usually for a limited term length.
Payments appear to be made to the external lawyers only after the application has been filed.
Because external law firms often have monthly billing cycles, the lawyers have an incentive to
complete applications before the end of the month. Further, attorneys in the law firms are evaluated
on the amount of hours billed each period and are monitored monthly for the number of hours yet
to be billed. This creates an additional incentive for the external lawyers to meet the end-of-month
billing deadlines, as does the need to manage cash flows.
5.6 Other Robustness Checks
We perform additional tests to check the robustness of the results reported above. First,
we use data on lawyers collated by Lai et al. (2009) to analyze if the firm-size effect documented
in Section 5.3 is driven by arrangements between large firms and external lawyers. Results are
presented in Appendix Table A.2. In columns 1 to 3, the specifications are similar to Equation 7
(columns 1 to 3 of Table 2), except that we add lawyer-year fixed effects to control for lawyer size.
The results confirm that, within a law firm in the same year, filings for larger clients are more likely
to be clustered at the month-end.30
Second, in the firm size analysis (Table 2), we further include fixed effects for patent class as
well as those for individual inventors. The former is to rule out potential sector-specific omitted
variables that may be correlated with both clustering pattern and firm size (e.g., if larger firms are
more active in certain patent classes). The latter rules out a role for inventor-level heterogeneity,
e.g., a concern that patterns of behavior of individual inventors may be driving the patterns in
application. The results, presented in Appendix Table A.3, show that the baseline results are
filings; often inventors are provided monetary incentives on filing of the patent as well as on successful grant of the
patent. Further, in most cases the number of patents applied/granted figure formally or informally in performance
evaluations of the R&D personnel. Performance evaluations tend to take place only periodically, normally coinciding
with the fiscal year reporting cycles. Thus, R&D personnel also have incentives to facilitate filing of patents within
the performance evaluation periods. However, given the fairly long lead time, often 3 to 6 months between idea
disclosure and patent application, and given that the last phases of application are handled by the lawyers, the
incentives for R&D personnel do not appear to be the primary driver of the clustering patterns. Consistent with
their lack of involvement and control over the actual application filing, and in contrast to the lawyers, the inventors
we interviewed were unaware of any clustering patterns.
30Within-law firm correlation between month-end clustering and client firm size could be due to work-flow on
larger clients being processed in batches to economize fixed costs in filing applications. However, this explanation is
incomplete - it is unclear why this batch processing happens precisely at the end of the month. Moreover, the effect
of firm size survives a further control of lawyer-firm pair monthly volume. Hence, the month-end clustering observed
in large firms is unlikely to be driven by batch processing of larger volume work by lawyers.
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robust to the inclusion of these additional controls of sector- or inventor-level heterogeneity.
6 Deadlines and Task Sorting
An important implication of deadlines is on task sorting. Our model predicts that deadline
penalties will influence task sorting; in particular, it predicts that if the penalties for not completing
tasks are sufficiently increasing in complexity, then there will be a clustering of higher complexity,
higher value work around the deadline. In our context, patent attorneys involved in filings likely face
a variety of different applications. In particular, different applications may involve different amount
of complexity, which is likely to be positively correlated with the importance of the applications.
In other words, some applications may be simple and straightforward, while other more important
patents are likely to be more complex. Given this variety, it is plausible that attorneys make different
decisions with regard to shifting of work effort for simpler versus more complex applications.
Because directly measuring the quality or importance of the idea underlying each patent
application is difficult, we examine three different observed variables that are likely to be correlated
with task application complexity or importance. First, we use the number of claims as a measure
of both the complexity of the application and the quality of the underlying idea (e.g., Lanjouw
and Schankerman, 2004). Fortunately, information on number of claims is available also in the
application data, allowing us to examine all filed applications. Second, we look at the number of
citations to a patent within the 5 years from its application date. Though citations have been used
in the literature as a proxy for patent quality (e.g., Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005), one drawback
of this measure is that it is applicable only to approved patent applications. Nevertheless, if poorer
(higher) quality ideas are systematically sorted towards month-ends, then we may expect the quality
of month-end patents to be lower (higher) on average. Our third measure is the probability of
renewal of the patent. It is likely that the patents that the assignee firm decides not to pay renewal
(i.e., maintenance) fees are of lower value (Pakes, 1986).
The results using all the available data are presented in Figure 4 and Table 5.31 In Figure 4,
across all three measures of idea quality, there is a sharp increase in the measure towards the end
of the month; the patent or application filed close to month-ends contain more claims, are cited
more frequently and are more likely to be renewed. Regressions in Table 5 confirm this pattern.
In columns 1 to 3, the number of claims is significantly larger for month-end applications: 0.9%
larger for applications filed in the last 3 days of the month, and 1.7% larger for those filed on the
last working day. Similarly, in columns 4 to 6, the 5-year citation count is greater for month-end
patents: citation count is about 0.6% higher for patents filed in the last 3 working days of the
month. Finally, in columns 7 to 9, month-end patents are more likely to be renewed, by about
31We checked and found the results in Table 5 robust to using data for only 2001-04 (see Appendix Table A.4).
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0.2%. Together, these tests strongly suggest that applications of higher compexity/quality ideas are
more prone to be completed towards month-ends. Further, these tests also rule out the possibility
of lawyers being less careful or more hurried with lower-value applications.
7 Deadlines and Work Quality
Beyond task sorting, another under-studied implication of deadlines is on the quality of
work. Our model predicts that if complex tasks are accelerated, deadline-driven clustering in work
flows will likely be associated with lower quality of the work product.32 In this section, we examine
work quality using three different measures: the probability of receiving an ‘Application Incompete’
notice from the USPTO, the probability of patent approval, and the duration of application review.
The first measure is an indicator variable for a notice from the USPTO that the submitted
application is incomplete. This ‘Application Incomplete’ notice is sent by the USPTO if the
minimum requirements of completeness discussed in Section 4 are not met, and implies that the
submitted materials are not yet entitled to a filing date (McWha and Ryan, 2008). Usually, these
notices are due to the applicant’s failure to conform to administrative formalities such as omitting
some of the required documents, missing signatures of some inventors, or using formats against the
USPTO guidelines. Therefore, they are a good indicator of deficiencies during the final stage of the
filing process. Though the applicants may be able to contest this notice and claim the original filing
date as the priority date, these notices require rework and re-filing by the lawyers, and hence impose
costs on the filing firm. The extra time and effort due to refiling could be a sizeable fraction of
the cost of the initial application.33 Furthermore, the additional processing delays patent approval.
Thus, in general, it is in the best interests of the applicant to ensure that the application meets the
minimum requirements for completeness.
To examine whether month-end applications are more likely to be declared incomplete, we




pjltm + α.yjt + τt + νm + fj + ε̃pjtm (11)
where Dkpjltm is a dummy defined earlier for the last k working days of the month, AIpjtm is 1 if the
application received an ‘Application Incomplete’ notice and 0 otherwise, τt and νm are application
year and application month fixed effects, and fj denotes firm fixed effects.
32To be precise, the prediction requires another assumption that the penalties are not high enough that certain
tasks are always accelerated. This assumption is likely to hold in reality since firms are unlikely to set up an incentive
structure that results in certain tasks being always accelerated.
33Our interviews with attorneys indicate that external attorneys charge client firms the costs associated with refiling
unless errors are clearly their fault. One respondent indicated that their firm charged around $3,000-5,000 for each
re-filing involving minor changes, and from $5,000-10,000 for those that involve more complicated responses. This is
very significant compared to the $10,000-15,000 the firm charges for the original application filing.
22
The first three columns of Table 6 present the results. From column 1, applications filed on
the last working day of the month are 4.6% more likely to receive an incomplete notice from the
USPTO. The corresponding numbers for the last 3 and 5 working days of the month are 3.6% and
3.0%, respectively. Given that only 29% of applications in the sample receive such a notice, these
differences are substantial (a 15.8%, 12.4% and 10.3% higher probability relative to the baseline
mean rate).
Because a range of different types of errors induced by rushing of applications could result in
them being deemed incomplete, the ‘Application Incomplete’ dummy is our preferred measure of
work quality. While the rework related to ‘Application Incomplete’ notices could entail considerable
costs for the attorneys, the more serious concern for the client firm is that the application is so
sloppy that it gets rejected. Hence, as a second measure we examine the probability of approval of
a patent. Because it takes several years for an application to be approved (or rejected), we limit
our analyses to applications in the years 2001 to 2004; for similar reasons and for comparability,
we use the same time period for the other two measures examined in this section. The results from
regressions similar to Equation 11 are presented in columns 4 to 6 of Table 6. In all three regressions,
coefficients on the end-of-the-month dummies are negative with the latter two columns showing
strong statistical significance. Based on column 5, the probability of approval for applications filed
in the last 3 working days of a month is about 0.46% lower than that for those filed on other days.
Because the average failure rate in the sample is only about 19%, this translates to a 2.4% higher
rate of rejection. The lower magnitude for this result is unsurprising since final approval is more
likely to be driven by the quality (and novelty) of the underlying idea, rather than the quality of
the drafting of the document itself.
Errors or sloppiness in the preparation of the application could cause delays in the review
process. Thus, as a third measure of work quality, we examine the log of the duration (in days)
between filing date and grant date for approved patent applications. Though the review length is
not associated with any direct monetary costs at the USPTO, longer reviews are costly for two
reasons. First of all, applications with longer reviews are more likely to receive multiple notices
that require re-work, which in turn substantially increases cost. Moreover, a firm can file a patent
infringement lawsuit only if the patent has been granted. Thus, delayed approval reduces the
potential bargaining power of the firm in competitive situations. We expect review length of a
patent application to be negatively related to the quality of the application draft, conditional on
firm fixed effects that control for unobserved firm-spepcific heterogeneity relating to technology
and quality of idea, and annual firm portfolio size that controls for within-firm innovation shocks.
That is, all else equal, poorly drafted applications are likely to require additional work, leading to
longer review duration.The results in columns 7 to 9 of Table 6 indicate that the review duration
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is indeed longer for month-end patents by 1.0 to 2.4% .
Figure 5 presents a variant of these results in a graphical format. Specifically, the figures
present a predicted fractional polynomial fit of the residuals of the dependent variable (de-meaned
of firm fixed effects) on working day of the month. It is clear from the figures that there is a
discernible change in work quality as we move from the first working day of a month to the last.
The magnitude of the differences are similar to that documented in Table 6. Together, consistent
with our model predictions, these results strongly suggest that the work quality of the applications
completed on the last few days of the month is distinctly lower.
To ensure the robustness of these results, we perform a series of tests on the statistical
association between month-end clustering and work quality. First, we rerun specifications in Table
6 including firm-claims fixed effects. This is to examine if the work quality results are entirely
a consequence of the sorting of more complex jobs to the month-end (as suggested by results in
Section 6), or if completion close to deadline has a negative effective after conditioning flexibly
on complexity. The results (panel A of Table A.5) are similar to Table 6, with somewhat larger
magnitudes for most coefficients (suggesting that work quality is worse when controlling carefully
for the number of claims). Thus, consistent with our model, the reduction in work quality holds
even when comparing work output with the same number of claims within the same firm.
Second, we re-estimate models in Table 6 including firm-volume fixed effects. This is to check
if the applications at the end of the month are poorer in quality mainly because of higher volumes or
if there is an additional month-end effect induced by the deadlines themselves. To allow the effect
of volume to be completely flexible, we define firm-volume as the number of patents filed by a firm
in a given month. Hence, this compares differences in work quality measures between month-ends
and other days with the same volume of applications within the same firm. The results (panel B
of Appendix Table A.5) show that, while there is a decline in magnitude of the month-end effects,
this decline is not very large (about 25%, 28%, and 35% decline in columns 3, 6 and 9 relative to
Table 6), and the effects remain statistically significant. Thus, though higher volume accounts for
a part of the month-end effect, a larger part of the negative effect on work quality appears to be
an independent month-end effect.34 We interpret this as suggesting that work completed close to
deadlines suffer additionally from being accelerated, even relative to other workdays with equally
high volumes of work.
Third, we repeat the analysis in Table 6 using data for years 2001 and 2002 only (providing
us with at least 8 years of post-application data). This mitigates potential bias from right censoring
34Higher volume does lower work quality; in untabulated regressions with log daily volume as a control, we found
higher volume is associated with significantly lower likelihood of approval, higher probability of receiving application
incomplete notices, and longer review duration.
24
in the dependent variables.35 The results presented in Appendix Table A.6 are similar to those
based on 2001-04 data in Table 6, suggesting that right censoring does not significantly affect the
baseline results.
Fourth, we interact the dummies of last working days of the month with firm size. Because
routines and associated deadlines are likely to be stronger at larger firms, if the decline in quality of
month-end applications is indeed related to deadlines, we should expect month-end effects for work
quality to increase with firm size. In Appendix Table A.7, though statistically insignificant, the
signs of the interaction terms indicate that the month-end effects are correlated with firm size in
the manner we would expect if lower quality were related to routine-driven deadlines and routines
are more prevalent at larger firms.
Finally, we re-ran Table 6 excluding the month of the fiscal year-end. One of our interviewees
noted that in their firm, borderline ideas in the first three quarters of the year were re-reviewed
in the last quarter. If annual targets had not been met, some of these marginal ideas were filed
towards the end of the year. We believe the results in Section 6 rules out negative selection as an
explanation for the work quality results, and that the inclusion of month fixed effects control for
general month-specific variations in work quality. Nevertheless, we explicitly address this possibility
by removing from the analysis the final months of the fiscal year. The baseline results were robust
to this exclusion (Appendix Table A.8).
8 Linking the Model and Empirics: A Simulation
Our model presented earlier analyzes how deadline-related penalties influence work flows,
task sorting and task quality. In this section, we examine if the model can reasonably replicate our
empirical findings, particularly figures 2, 4 and 5. In so doing, we hope to provide both a reality
check of the model as well as to illustrate the linkage between the model and the empirics.
We simulate data for 27 months of 25 days for 50 firms, with patent application jobs arriving
at a rate of one per day. To abstract from initial transitional dynamics, we drop the first 3 months.
We assume a(x) = c(x) = x2, and b(x) = x3, so that t∗ = x and f(t∗) = t∗. We set T = 25 and
T = 126 so that the range of durations extends from one month to five months. We set γ=15
X 10−6 to yield a last day share of 10%. In the benchmark “No Deadline” regime there is no
35For example, application success is defined as 0 for applications where there is no evidence of approval as of
November 2011. As noted in Section 7, this was why we restricted the data period to 2001-2004, allowing for 6 years
of time for processing of applications. In general, we may not expect this right censoring to bias results for month-end
applications relative to others; however, the finding in Table 5 that the duration of review is longer for month-end
applications raises some concern that month-end applications coded as unsuccessful may in fact be still under review.
Concerns relating to right censoring also apply to the duration of review. Right censoring is less of an issue for the
‘Application Incomplete’ variable because, conditional on censoring, the mean observed duration between application
date and notification date is much lower (only about 2 months) than that between application date and grant date
(about 3.25 years).
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month-end penalty. In both the “No Deadline” and “Deadline” scenarios, we added a stochastic
component to the filing date, to capture un-modeled factors (e.g., disruptions due to health issues
or personal vacations). Specifically, we allowed for each application to finish up to 5 days before or
after a scheduled date (including application initially rescheduled to be filed at month-end), with
a 5% probability for each of the 10 alternative days.
The simulated data confirm the model propositions and replicate key empirical results (see
Appendix Figure A.2 and Appendix Table A.9). In particular, we find that in the deadline regime:
(i) there is significant clustering at the month-end; (ii) complexity is higher at the month-end; and
(iii) the error rate is higher at the month-end, both conditional and unconditional on complexity.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the effects are reasonably comparable to our empirical results.
We checked and confirmed robustness of these results to a range of alternative parameter values
consistent with the above assumptions, and to alternative penalty schemes such as making the
penalty dependent on the degree of completion.
9 Discussion and Conclusion
Personal experiences and considerable anecdotal evidence suggest that deadlines influence
work flows. Further, whether it be students re-arranging their study schedules or salespeople
modifying their sales patterns, deadlines have been shown in the literature to change work flows
in many contexts (e.g., Oyer 1998, Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002). This study adds to that body
of empirical evidence by examining large scale, high frequency data on a single, relatively uniform
process across thousands of firms over a long period of time, and documenting striking patterns of
month-end, quarter-end and year-end clustering in patent applications. The magnitudes of these
clustering patterns are significant, e.g., the daily share of corporate patents is about 17.7% higher
in the last week of the month than in the first week of the month.
Several pieces of evidence strongly suggest a role for routine-related deadlines at large firms
in generating these patterns. Applications by individual assignees do not show sharp spikes near
month-ends, except before October 1 when any increases in USPTO fees take effect. In contrast,
relative to the baseline pattern of patenting by individual assignees, the share of corporate patents
in the last week is about 7.5% higher and about 3.8% lower in the first week. Further, regression
results show that the propensity to file during month-ends is significantly higher among firms with
high patent volume. Changes in fiscal year-ends are systematically correlated with changes in the
clustering patterns of patent filings. Finally, interviews with patent attorneys and inventors indicate
that routine-generated deadlines are the likely cause of the clustering patterns.
Prior studies have suggested that these changes in work flows may be caused by time-
inconsistent preferences (or procrastination) when prioritizing various tasks to be completed before
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the deadline (e.g., O’Donaghue and Rabin 2001). We diverge from this line of thought by offering
a simple model that does not invoke time-inconsistent preferences as an explanation for these
clustering patterns. In particular, we develop a simple model of rational responses to discontinuous
incentives around deadline thresholds. The intuition captured by the model is straightforward:
faced with a discontinuous penalty at the deadline, agents respond by shifting completion of some
work to the deadline. This explains the clustering of applications around deadlines. Our model
also makes related predictions on task sorting and work quality. In particular, it predicts that in a
likely scenario where deadline penalties do not decrease with task complexity, more complex tasks
are more likely to be accelerated for completion. Further, our model predicts a higher error rate
on tasks completed near deadlines if more complex tasks are accelerated and deadline penalties are
low enough that at least some fraction of tasks are completed without rushing.36
Results from additional empirical analyses are consistent with these latter predictions. We
find that applications filed near month-ends are of higher importance and complexity. The number
of claims is 0.8-1.7% larger for applications filed near month-ends. Conditional on approval, the
5-year citation count for patents filed near month-ends is 0.4-1.5% higher as is the probability of
renewal (0.2-0.3%). Thus, this suggests that the penalty structure is not decreasing in complexity.37
This is not unreasonable since more complex filings are likely to be more valuable to the firm, and
hence delays in such filings are likely to attract greater penalties. Beyond shedding light on the
systematic association between task sorting and deadlines, these results also rule out the possibility
that, in our context, deadline-related reductions in work quality are driven by agents choosing to
rush tasks of lower importance. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to document clustering
of more complex tasks close to deadlines; future work in other contexts could shed light on the
robustness of this finding.
Finally, deadline-driven clustering may be interesting but is relevant for workplace
productivity only if such clustering affects the quality of work performed around deadlines. We
find that, consistent with our model, output quality is indeed lower around month-ends. The effect
is stronger when using a shorter-term measure that likely reflects errors in the last stage of the
filing process: applications filed closer to month-ends are about 12.5% more likely to be considered
incomplete by the USPTO. The impact on the eventual success of the applications is smaller; they
tend to be rejected 2.5% more than those filed during other days, and take 1.5% longer to review.
The modest magnitudes for longer-term measures should be interpreted in keeping in mind that
36Our first and second predictions are also consistent with the time-inconsistent preferences model in O’Donaghue
and Rabin (2001); the key novelty in their model is that it generates extra procrastination on more important tasks.
Our prediction on work quality could potentially be obtained from their model by including a decline in work quality
as an additional cost to accelerating work close to the deadline.




the underlying idea quality or novelty, rather than documentation errors, is likely to play a much
greater role in determining in eventual application approval and total review duration.
Our work is closely related to two recent papers that examine the effect of deadlines on
work quality. Carpenter et al. (2012) find that an administrative tool that introduced deadlines
at the U.S. FDA led to a piling up of decisions before deadlines, and these “just-before-deadline”
approvals were linked to significantly higher rates of postmarket safety problems - the probability
of a new black-box warning was 3.3 times greater and the probability of a safety-based withdrawal
was 6.9 times greater for a drug approved two months before the deadline. Cadena et al. (2011) find
significant clustering of credit placement at the end of the month in the Colombian bank they study.
A randomized intervention (using prizes coupled with reminders and public recognition) reduced
the clustering and evened out credit placement, reduced work-related stress levels, and increased
job satisfaction. However, there was no significant impact on overall productivity (measured in the
number of loans placed per period), or delinquency rates (which could be viewed as a measure of
work quality). Our finding of modest effects on work quality, particularly on the longer term, is
consistent with the results in Cadena et al. (2011). The contrast with Carpenter et al. (2012),
who find strikingly large work quality effects, could be because of two important differences in
the context: (i) they examine a government agency whereas we examine behavior of firms in a
competitive marketplace; and (ii) they study one program that introduced new deadlines - these
may have been suboptimal relative to the optimal duration required for a careful review. In our
context, both the discipline imposed by market competition, as well as refinement of deadlines
and associated incentives over time, could have led to a system with less severe distorting effects,
particularly on long-term measures of work quality.
Together, our empirical results are consistent with our model predictions, suggesting that
invoking time-inconsistent preferences is not necessary to explain the robust empirical regularities
we document. However, two caveats are worth noting. First, as discussed earlier, unlike other
models such as O’Donaghue and Rabin (2001), our model does not endogenize deadlines. It focuses
on behavior, once deadlines are in place; it is agnostic about why deadlines exist. Thus, formal
or informal penalties for missing deadlines may still be aimed at controlling for procrastinating
behavior arising from time-inconsistent preferences. A second important caveat is that our data do
not allow us to definitely answer whether the observed patterns are indeed driven by pre-planned
acceleration (as in our model) or by ex-post acceleration prompted by procrastination. While it is
possible that our results are driven by procrastination, it is less likely for two reasons. One, delays
in our context can be very costly.38 Thus, firms and their lawyers have strong incentives to avoid
38For instance, the importance of filing first is often discussed in the well-known Elisha Gray-Alexander Graham
Bell controversy, though accounts of this controversy vary. In brief, on February 14, 1876, Alexander Graham Bell,
through his attorney, filed for an important patent related to the telephone. Even though Elisha Gray had developed
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delays. Moreover, no practitioner we interviewed with suggested controlling for procrastination as
a motivation for quotas and deadlines; rather, these appeared to be motivated by planning and
coordination objectives. Nonetheless, it is possible that procrastination has a role in these results.
We leave a more thorough investigation of this question to future work.
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Table 1: Heterogeneity in Patenting Patterns: Individuals versus Corporates
The table presents coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the difference between the day-
share of annual patent applications for firms and the corresponding share for individual assignees. The independent
variables are dummy variables corresponding to the period mentioned in the rows. These regressions use data on
granted patents from 1976-2009. The day-share for a given day is computed as the ratio of the number of successful
patents applied on that day to the total number of successful patents over the sample period.
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Difference in day share
Days 1-7 -0.103** -0.256** -0.166**
(0.025) (0.039) (0.039)
Days 8-15 -0.101** -0.254** -0.164**
(0.019) (0.035) (0.035)
Days 16-23 -0.002 -0.155** -0.066
(0.036) (0.046) (0.046)
Days 24 and Beyond 0.205**
(0.032)
Last Day of Month 0.389**
(0.108)




R2 0.170 0.217 0.251
N 366 366 366
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05, + p<0.1; Coefficients and standard errors multiplied
by 1000.
Table 2: Effect of Firm Size on End-of-Month Clustering – Fixed Effects OLS
Columns 1-3 use granted patents in 1976-2009 (N=2,878,229) while columns 4-6 use published applications filed in
2001-2010 (N=1,856,934). The dependent variable (Dn) in each column is a dummy variable that is 1 if the patent
(or application) was applied on the last n working day of a month, and 0 otherwise. Assignee-year size is defined as
the number of successful patents applied by an assignee during a given year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. D1 D3 D5 D1 D3 D5
(Patent data) (Application data)
Log Firm-Year Size 2.842** 5.533** 6.542** 2.662** 5.350** 6.001**
(0.582) (0.702) (0.676) (0.700) (1.075) (1.195)
R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Coefficients
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I Properties of z∗











Since the left hand side of (5) is increasing in z, z∗ represents the upper bound beyond which it is not
optimal to accelerate tasks of a given complexity.
I.A z∗ is increasing in γ for any given t∗








is increasing in γ for any given t∗


















. Using the result from above for the first partial derivative w.r.t γ, and then









1+φ where φ = t
∗µ. Therefore, at very low



















































































for very low values of γ.
II Clustering and Complexity











+ µ. Substituting µ =
√
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f ′(t∗) < 2f(t
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is increasing in t∗.









∂t∗ , which simplifies to
2t∗µ+(t∗)2µ2+(t∗)2 ∂µ
∂t∗
(1+t∗µ)2 . This is positive if the numerator is positive. Applying this, substituting for µ and




















III.A T < D and T > D
In the first instance, the duration for the most complex task is less than the time between deadlines.
Therefore, only (z∗/t∗) and its properties is relevant in determining behavior. In the second case, the
duration for the least complex task is more than the time between deadlines. Therefore, all tasks span across
at least two deadlines. Further, in this case, all deadline behavior is determined by z∗, and not by (z∗/t∗).
A summary of the model’s predictions is presented in the table following this appendix.
III.B Impact of decreasing D
Decreasing D is equivalent to increasing the frequency of deadlines. Suppose, in the beginning, D0
is so large that T < D0. Then, initially, there is no effect of a decrease in D on work flows, task sorting or
task quality. As D declines enough so that T > D1, say, then under some conditions, D becomes relevant in
determining deadline behavior. In particular, if γ is high enough that z∗ > D1 for tasks of some complexities,
then decreasing D below D1, to say D2 increases the extent of task acceleration. This occurs since for some
tasks, z∗ in the first regime (when D = D1) will be s.t. D2 < z
∗ < D1. While these tasks will only be
partially accelerated when D = D1, they will be completely accelerated irrespective of the instant of arrival
when D = D2. The impact on complexity will depend on the rate of increase of f(t
∗). If it is s.t. both
(z∗/t∗) and z∗ are increasing, then average complexity of accelerated tasks will increase as D decreases. If
both are decreasing, then the average complexity of accelerated tasks will decrease. Finally, decreasing D
when leads to a decrease in the mean error rate. This occurs because the error rate will be lower for tasks
that are completely accelerated irrespective of the day of arrival.
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SUMMARY OF MODEL PREDICTIONS 
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Appendix Table A.1: Inter-firm Heterogeneity in Patenting Patterns: Small vs Large
Corporates
The table presents coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the difference between the day-
share of annual patenting (or applications) for “Large” corporate assignees and the corresponding share for “Small”
corporate assignees. “Large” assignees are defined as those with more than 100 patents filed over the data period.
“Small” assignees are defined as those with just a single patent over the data period. The independent variables are
dummy variables corresponding to the period indicated in the rows. The first three columns use data on granted
patents from 1976-2009 while the next three use data on published applications that were applied between 2001 and
2010. For granted patents, the day-share for a given day (e.g. for Jun 30 for large assignees) is computed as the ratio
of the number of successful patents applied on that day (6,864 for large assignees for Jun 30) to the total number of
successful patents over the sample period (1,043,628 for large assignees, thus arriving at a share of 0.00658). Hence,
each observation corresponds to one day of the year. The calculations for applications is similar.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Granted Patents Data) (Application Data)
Days 1-7 -0.117** -0.369** -0.282** -0.167** -0.469** -0.377**
(0.031) (0.053) (0.054) (0.033) (0.059) (0.054)
Days 8-15 -0.148** -0.401** -0.314** -0.182** -0.484** -0.392**
(0.024) (0.049) (0.050) (0.033) (0.058) (0.053)
Days 16-23 -0.044 -0.296** -0.209** -0.037 -0.339** -0.248**
(0.039) (0.059) (0.059) (0.039) (0.062) (0.057)
Days 24 and Beyond 0.314** 0.390**
(0.044) (0.056)
Last Day of Month 0.461** 0.659**
(0.137) (0.214)
Last 3 Days of Month 0.371** 0.449**
(0.087) (0.117)
Constant 0.253** 0.165** 0.302** 0.210**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.042)
R2 0.226 0.267 0.281 0.256 0.316 0.314
N 366 366 366 366 366 366
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Coefficients
and standard errors multiplied by 1000.
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Appendix Table A.2: Lawyers and End-of-Month Clustering
The table presents coefficients from OLS regressions. These regressions use data on granted patents from 1995-
2009 (N=1,792,838). Earlier data are not used due to lack of data on lawyers. The dependent variable (Dn) in
each column is a dummy variable that is 1 if the patent was applied on the last n working day of a month, and 0
otherwise. Assignee-year size is defined as the number of successful patents applied by an assignee during a given
year. Lawyer-firm-year-month volume is defined as the number of patents applied by a lawyer for a given firm in a
given month.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. D1 D3 D5 D1 D3 D5
Log Firm-Year Size 2.620** 5.559** 6.473** 0.945* 2.297** 2.987**
(0.438) (0.580) (0.601) (0.373) (0.551) (0.555)
Log Lawyer-Firm-Year-Month Volume 5.930** 11.552** 12.342**
(1.246) (2.049) (2.138)
R2 0.117 0.109 0.107 0.118 0.110 0.108
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Lawyer-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Coefficients and standard errors
multiplied by 1000.
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Appendix Table A.3: Firm Size and End-of-Month Clustering – Including Patent Class and
Inventor Fixed Effects
All columns use data on granted patents from 1976-2009. The dependent variable (Dn) in each column is a dummy
variable that is 1 if the patent (or application) was filed on the last n working day of a month, and 0 otherwise.
Assignee-year size is defined as the number of successful patents applied by an assignee during a given year. In
columns 1-3, each observation corresponds to an inventor-patent observation (N=6,386,845), while in columns 4-6,
each observation corresponds to a patent (N=2,878,229).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep var. D1 D3 D5 D1 D3 D5
(Patent class fixed effects) (Inventor fixed effects)
Log Firm-Year Size 2.284** 4.560** 5.481** 1.464** 2.573** 2.670**
(0.454) (0.571) (0.578) (0.238) (0.392) (0.481)
R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.302 0.299 0.298
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Inventor Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Patent Class Fixed Effects YES YES YES NO NO NO
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Coefficients and standard errors
multiplied by 1000.
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